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Abstract
This article studies how the managers of a regulated fi rm can use debt and equity contracts 
to constrain the regulator’s policy through the contingent transfer of control to external 
investors with high relative liquidation value. External fi nance increases regulated income 
and facilitates investment, but managers generally choose socially excessive levels of 
outside funds. If bankruptcy law favors reorganization over liquidation, the managers’s value 
of debt for a given investment level decreases. In the presence of income risk, regulatory ex 
ante commitment can increase the fi rm’s value if the regulator’s preference for continuation 
is high relative to that of managers.
Keywords: Industrial regulation, capital structure, control rights, hold-up, bankruptcy.
JEL classifi cation: L51, L52, G32, G33.
Resumen
Este artículo estudia como los administradores de una empresa regulada pueden utilizar 
contratos de deuda y ampliaciones de capital para restringir la política del regulador por 
medio de la transferencia del poder de control sobre la empresa a inversores externos con 
un alto valor de liquidación. La fi nanciación externa incrementa los benefi cios regulados y 
facilita la inversión, pero los administradores de la empresa generalmente eligen un nivel 
socialmente excesivo de fondos externos. Si la ley concursal favorece la reorganización 
sobre la liquidación, el valor de la deuda para los administradores disminuye para un nivel 
dado de inversión. En presencia de riesgo sobre el benefi cio de la empresa, el compromiso 
infl exible del regulador a una política que no reacciona al nivel de benefi cios puede llevar 
a un incremento del valor de la empresa para los administradores si la preferencia del 
regulador por la continuidad de la empresa regulada es superior a la de estos.
Palabras claves: Regulación Industrial, estructura de capital, derechos de control, captura 
del inversor, derecho concursal. 
Códigos JEL: L51, L52, G32, G33.
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1 Introduction
The capital structure literature has studied in detail how the contingent allocation of con-
trol rights between managers and investors can improve incomplete financial contracts and
raise the value of firms, e. g., Hart and Moore (1989, 1998), Aguion and Bolton (1992)
and Dewatripont and Tirole (1994). The relation between private control rights and the
power of government regulation over certain business decisions of firms has not received a
comparable amount of attention. In this article, I study the interaction of the rights over
reorganization and liquidation granted by the financial contracts of a regulated firm with the
regulator’s control over the income of the firm. For example, debt contracts transfer control
over operations and liquidation from managers to investors in the event of bankruptcy, and
debtholders’s protection under bankruptcy law can also limit the administrative control of
the firm by the regulator. In this framework, I investigate (i) the ability and incentives of
managers to constrain the regulator’s policy through the use of financial contracts and (ii)
the impact of different bankruptcy and regulatory regimes on the value of the firm and the
welfare measured by the regulator.
I consider a regulated firm where private managers hold initially a full equity stake and
can decide whether to liquidate or reorganize all or part of the firm’s projects. A positive
investment level is required to make the firm operational and the regulator controls partially
the income yield of the firm. The financing of this investment is complicated by the presence
of non verifiable private benefits for the managers and the capacity of the regulator to hold
up the firm once the investment is committed. External financing creates a credible threat
of transfer of control of the liquidation and reorganization decisions to investors with a lower
interest in continuation of the firm’s projects than the regulator or the owners-managers.
External investors can only appropriate the verifiable income of the firm and they have
therefore a lower continuation value than managers, who also derive private benefits, and
the regulator, who also values consumer surplus.
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ample, rate of return regulation and price cap regimes leave utility regulators freedom to
manipulate the regulated income of the firms in their jurisdictions.1 The discretion of these
regulators to disallow imprudent investment costs in the calculation of regulated income
requirements is also significant, as accounted in Lyon and Mayo (2005) for the US electricity
sector. If the income of a utility firm is high, the regulator will be pressed by consumer
groups to reduce prices. The lack of ex-ante commitment power creates a hold-up risk for
investors in regulated firms and it might prevent socially valuable investments.2
The liquidation of the assets of a bankrupt regulated firm is also a real possibility with
detrimental consequences for consumers. For example, Washington Public Power Supply
System (WPPSS) default in 1982 lead to the abandonment of four incomplete nuclear power
plants, with partial repayments to bondholders funded by increases in consumer rates of the
member utilities of WPPSS.3 In this case, the threat of costly liquidation in the bankruptcy
procedure induced an upward revision of regulated prices that favored external investors
at the cost of consumers. Ex ante, the use of debt might have facilitated the financing of
a new technology with uncertain cost, as the investors could anticipate a higher degree of
protection than with an equity contribution. Financial distress does not necessarily involve
the dismantling of physical assets, but it might entail reorganization or a transfer of the
assets of the regulated company to an external firm. The regulator might still be reluctant
to enter the reorganization process, as it might affect the quality of service and force a
revision of regulatory policy, e. g., the increase in regulated prices might be necessary to
facilitate other concessions from creditors. On the contrary, the possible improvements of
governance and operations associated to the reorganization process represent a potential
1The U.S. Supreme Court sentence on Hope Natural Gas (1944) set the reasonable rate doctrine that
allows regulators to choose rates as long as they allow an adequate return on a well managed firm.
2See Salant and Woroch (1992) and Gilbert and Newbery (1994) for regulation with lack of commitment
in a dynamic setting. Albuquerque and Hopenhayn (2004) study a dynamic capital structure choice problem.
Che and Sakovics (2004, 2008) study the hold-up problem in a general framework.
3WPPSS was an association of several municipal utilities in Washington state. The default of WPPSS
implied the reorganization of the association, but, at the project level, it implied the liquidation of multiple
nuclear power plants. See Alexander et al. (1983) and Pope (2008) for historical details of the WPPSS
default and Lyon and Mayo (2005) and Joskow et al. (1989) for analysis of the cost disallowances in the US
electricity sector in the 1980s.
benefit for regulators.
Regulators enjoy discretion to impact the income of firms in different sectors. For ex-
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The base model in the paper considers a regulator with deterministic control of the income
of the regulated firm. If managers with high private benefits finance the firm with internal
funds or new non-voting equity, they maintain their control rights. The regulator can then
limit the firm’s income to favor consumers without risking liquidation. The managers and
external investors anticipate the low regulated income and they will have lower incentives to
finance the initial investment in the firm.
The use of debt financing creates the possibility of bankruptcy and transfer of control
over the liquidation decision to external investors. Leverage can then force the regulator
to increase regulated income to avoid partial or total liquidation of the firm’s assets. The
capacity of leverage to force higher regulated income increases with the liquidation value
and decreases with potential gains of reorganization through the bankruptcy process. The
regulator anticipates that reorganization gains can generate additional verifiable income to
compensate investors and reduces regulated income. The reorganization process following
bankruptcy can also restrict private benefits and it will thus further reduce the strategic
value of debt for managers for a given level of financing. The bankruptcy reorganization
process can still increase the value of the firm for managers if it generates enough verifiable
income to finance an investment that was not otherwise viable. The transfer of control to
external equity holders through new voting equity can have the same effect as the use of debt
if external equity holders can not acquire a big portion of the private benefits of managers.
The transfer of control rights to debtholders or external equity holders mitigates the
hold-up problem by forcing regulators to avoid the bankruptcy procedure. The remedy is
not perfect, as the firm’s managers can also use debt to increase regulated income above
the level required to sustain investment. Managers do not internalize the social costs of the
increase in regulated income, e. g., high regulated utility rates cause monopolistic quantity
distortions.
The basic model is extended with the addition of income risk. The income of the firm
includes now a portion controlled by the regulator and a purely random component. For
example, an utility firm is affected by shocks to technology and energy prices. If a regulator
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wants to ensure the continuation of the firm at all possible income states, it is forced to set
the regulated portion of income so that the value of continuation exceeds that of liquidation
even at the lowest income state. Alternatively, the regulator might find optimal to allow
liquidation at low income states to reduce the average regulated income. The strategic value
of the capital structure in this setting depends on the relative preference for continuation
of the regulator and the managers. If the regulator is highly averse to liquidation of the
firm’s assets, the use of debt will force higher regulated income than in the base case. If the
managers are highly averse to liquidation, they will reduce the level of leverage to make this
event less likely.
In this setting, it is not necessarily optimal to have the regulator committed to a particular
policy before the income state is known. The possibility to adjust policy ex post might allow
the regulator to achieve a higher total welfare by ensuring continuation at all income states
and avoiding excessive regulated income at high income states. The cost of this lack of
commitment is that the managers have no incentive to contain debt, as the regulator will be
able to adjust regulated income to ensure continuation for a given level of leverage.
The need to cover the investment costs of regulated firms is recognized since at least
the early work of Boiteux (1956). The modern industrial regulation literature, e. g., Baron
and Myerson (1982) and Laffont and Tirole (1986), incorporates profit requirements derived
from investment needs in the participation constraint of the firm and focuses on informational
problems. In this literature, the incentives of a regulated monopolist to invest in efficiency
have also been studied in articles such as Riordan (1987) and Tirole (1986). The surveys in
Baron (1989), Laffont and Tirole (1993) and Armstrong and Sappington (2007) reveal that
the works studying the capital structure of regulated firms are more scarce.
The closest references to this problem in the regulation literature are Spiegel and Spulber
(1994, 1997) and Dasgupta and Nanda (1993). In these articles, the bargaining effect of
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capital structure, and debt in particular, originates from the presence of bankruptcy costs in
the firm (legal fees and reorganization). These papers are implicitly considering bankruptcy
regulation that imposes mandatory and costly reorganization. In the US legal system, the
creditors of a firm would be compelled to file for Chapter 11 if the firm fails to honor its
debt. The regulator internalizes (at least partially) the costs of the bankruptcy procedure
and reduces the likelihood of financial failure by allowing higher regulated prices.
The current article allows the party with the control of the firm to choose whether to
initiate the bankruptcy procedure rather than imposing automatic reorganization. This
bankruptcy procedure can be interpreted as reorganization or liquidation and accommodate
both the Chapter 11 and Chapter 7 regimes in the US bankruptcy code. Debt can still
constrain the regulator even if there are no explicit bankruptcy costs, i. e., no positive differ-
ence between firm’s continuation value and the value under the most favorable bankruptcy
procedure, as investors have greater incentives to liquidate the business. The existence of
an optimal capital structure depends rather on the conflict of interest between the investors,
managers and the regulator.
Faure-Grimaud (1997) also considers the interaction between financial markets and in-
dustrial regulation. In that article, the regulated firm can deteriorate the profits of its
competitors with a costly predatory action and the incentive to do so depends on the regula-
tory regime in place. Financial markets enter the model through the use by the competitors
of the regulated firm of incomplete financial contracts to obtain financing, in an adaptation
of the model in Bolton and Scharfstein (1990). In the current article, the regulated firm
makes strategic use of its own financial contracts.
The focus in the corporate finance literature, Aghion and Bolton (1992), Hart and Moore
(1989,1998) and Dewatripont and Tirole (1994) is on the characterization of bilateral efficient
contracting between external investors and inside management. The main interest of the
current article is the study of the externalities that the financial contracts of the firm impose
on a third party (consumers) and its strategic effect on the actions of an external agent (the
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regulator).4 The financial contracting framework considered is close to Aghion and Bolton
(1992), with bankruptcy contingent on verifiable variables and a discrete decision for the
party in control.5 Hart and Moore (1989,1998) analyze bilateral bankruptcy renegotiation
in a different setting where firm’s assets work as collateral and facilitate additional future
investments. Debt financing allows the investors to seize this valuable collateral and provides
them with higher bargaining power in the bankruptcy procedure. Dewatripont and Tirole
(1994) study the use of capital structure to create a probability of investor interference with
management and induce managerial effort. In that article, the optimal capital structure
trades off effort inducement and inefficient interference.
The empirical financial literature, starting with Baxter (1967),Warner (1977) and Haugen
and Senbet (1978), has found a moderate size of direct bankruptcy costs. Hotchkiss et al.
(2007) report a range of estimates in this literature in between 1% and 10% of assets existing
previous to financial distress. Indirect costs can increase the burden of bankruptcy and are
a function of regulation, as presented in Jensen (1991). The estimates of indirect costs also
range widely. Andrade and Kaplan (1998) find that indirect costs of financial distress are
small in the absence of a negative economic shock. Altman (1984) estimates indirect costs
equal to 10% of the value of the firm, but he can not separate the financial and economic
components in these estimates. The current article provides a theory that creates a role for
the capital structure of the regulated firm even if the bankruptcy costs of the firm are small.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the base model with no
income risk and Section 3 analyzes equilibrium capital structure and regulation. Section 4
introduces risk in the income of the firm and reexamines the managers’s choice of capital
structure and regulation policy. Section 5 concludes.
4The study of control rights is encompassed into the broader optimal capital structure literature reacting
to the Modigliani and Miller (1958) result on the value irrelevance of the capital structure. See the early
contributions of Jensen and Meckling (1976), Myers (1977), Ross (1977) and Townsend (1979).
5Aghion and Bolton (1992) study efficient bilateral contracts in a general setting with different assump-
tions on the correlation of private benefits and total returns and the verifiability of income. The current
work uses a specific return structure for the firm adapted closely to analyze bankruptcy and incorporates
the regulator’s policy problem.
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2 Base Model
The main elements of the model include the market and cost conditions in which the regu-
lated firm operates, the payoffs of the regulator, managers and investors, and the temporal
structure. I define each of these elements in turn.
The Firm
There is a single firm with the opportunity to invest K to acquire technology and
equipment with application to two different sectors. For example, telephone companies can
offer basic telephone services and mobile telephone services. I assume that the income from
activities in the first sector depends on a regulatory decision over quantity q whereas the
income from the second sector is given exogenously.6
The verifiable income from the unregulated sector is exogenously fixed at π > 0 and the
private benefits associated to the management of the firm are fixed at B > 0. The private
benefits B can include non-pecuniary elements and non-verifiable income. Regulated income
is given by the function π(q), where q is a regulated quantity that is defined over the interval
[0, q], for q ∈ R+. For example, the quantity q can correspond to the level of coverage, i. e.,
the number of users, of a telephone or an electricity firm. The underlying inverse demand and
cost functions, p(q) and C(q) such that π(q) = p(q)q−C(q), satisfy the following conditions:
(i) p(q) is C2, p(q) > 0 and ∂p(q)/∂q = p′(q) < 0 on [0, q].
(ii) C(q) is C2, ∂C(q)/∂q = C ′(q) > 0 and ∂C(q)/∂q2 = C ′′(q) ≥ 0 on [0, q].
(iii) p(0)− C ′(0) > 0.
The firm can be operated to obtain verifiable income π + π(q) and private benefits B or
enter into a liquidation process with three main features: first, it overrules the regulatory
control over q and generates a total verifiable value L; second, it supresses private benefits
B and; third, it produces no consumer surplus. The amount L is the maximum value that
6The second sector can also be regulated to some extent. For example, utilities are subject to environ-
mental and safety regulation even in competitive sectors. The important assumptions are that (i) the two
sectors are regulated separately (ii) and regulation in the second sector does not react to the firm’s income
and financial strategy.
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investors can attain through partial or total liquidation of the firm’s assets. The liquidation
process does not necessarily shuts down the firm, but the scaling down of the firm’s assets
is detrimental to consumers and the collection of private benefits.7
I assume that it is not (at least weakly) efficient to invest K to obtain liquidation value
L and that exogenous income π does not avoid liquidation: π ≤ L ≤ K. I further assume
that there are quantity levels q∗L and q
∗
K such that the verifiable value of the firm exceeds
investment cost K and liquidation value L. If π(q) is concave, this implicitly assumes that
monopoly quantity qm satisfies qm ≤ q∗K ≤ q∗L, with π(qm) + π − K ≥ 0.8 Condition (iii)
guarantees that qm > 0.
The Regulator
The consumer surplus generated by the activities in the regulated sector is given by
the non-negative function CS(q), which is C2 and has a first derivative CS ′(q) > 0 given
condition (i). The consumer surplus from the unregulated sector is exogenously fixed at
CS > 0. I allow for the possibility that the regulator is more concerned about consumer
surplus than the income of the firm by assuming an objective function W (q) such that:
W (q) = α · (π(q) + π −K) + CS + CS(q) (1)
where α ∈ [0, 1] weights the preference of the regulator toward consumers. The statues of
the regulator exclude the private benefits of managers B from the welfare computation.
The regulator has the authority to choose the quantity q. Given the assumptions on π(q)
and CS(q) and the support of q, the optimal quantity qr that maximizesW (q) is guaranteed
to exist. This quantity qr exceeds the monopoly quantity qm and it can be at the boundary
of the support, i. e., qr = q, if CS(q) increases sufficiently fast.9 To facilitate the analysis, I
7The analysis is not substantially altered if liquidation does not suppress the private benefits and consumer
surplus entirely. For example, I could assume liquidation brings negative shocks ΔB < 0 and ΔCS < 0.
8These quantities would be defined by the expressions q∗L ≡ max q such that π(q∗L) + π − L = 0 and
q∗K ≡ max q such that π(q∗K) + π −K = 0. If there are multiple quantities that yield the same profit, the
higher quantity Pareto dominates the lower one, which it is then discarded.
9Given CS′(q) > 0 in [0, q], we obtain that α ·π′(qm)+CS′(qm) = CS′(qm) > 0 and the regulator expands
quantity q beyond the monopolistic level qm.
guarantee that W (q) and π(q) are concave by imposing the following condition on p′′(q):
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(2 · α− 1) · p′(q)− α · C ′′(q)
(1− α) < p
′′(q) · q < C ′′(q)− 2 · p′(q) (2)
Concavity of π(q) and W (q) ensures that qr and qm are uniquely defined. The Appendix
A derives condition (2) and proves that the bounds on p′′(q) · q are well-defined.
The preference for consumer surplus over the income of the firm might lead to negative
regulated income at the quantity qr. This outcome can be ruled out if α ·π′(q0)+CS ′(q0) < 0
at the maximum quantity q0 > qm at which π(q0) = 0. For given π(q) and CS(q), this would
involve placing a bound α0 = −CS ′(q0)/π′(q0) such that α ≥ α0.
The project is socially beneficial for q = qm. That is, π(qm)+π−K+B+CS+CS(qm) > 0.
This follows from previous assumptions: B > 0, CS > 0, π(qm)+π−K > 0 and CS(qm) > 0.
The positivity of all these terms also implies that W (qm) is positive even if the regulator
excludes private benefits B:
W (qm) = α · (π(qm) + π −K) + CS + CS(qm) > 0 (3)
This also implies that the regulator does not want to liquidate the project once the
investment cost is sunk, as L ≤ K and the relative gain of continuation with respect to
liquidation is at least as big asW (qm). The regulator might be willing to implement a project
with qr ≤ q < qm and negative social value if α is sufficiently low. However, managers and
investors would not finance such projects, as it is presented below.
The Managers and the Investors
I assume that both the managers and the external investors are risk neutral. For a given
regulated quantity q, the payoff from continuation of the firm for managers with a full equity
stake can then be written as Um(q) = π(q)+π+B−K. The external investors can not claim
private benefits B. An investor that appropriates the full verifiable income of the project
receives then UI(q) = π(q) + π −K.
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The managers are assumed to have an initial full equity stake in the firm and cash at
hand equal to A < K, so they are forced to use the capital markets if the project is to
be executed. The lending activity in the capital market is perfectly competitive and, for
simplicity, all agents are assumed to have a discount factor of 1.
The managers would be willing to invest and continue operations at the quantity level
qr: π(qr) + π + B −K > 0. The external investors do not internalize private benefits B so
they would require the verifiable value of the firm to cover the investment costs. I assume
that π(qr)+π < L ≤ K to create a difference in the preference for continuation of managers
and investors at the optimal regulated quantity qr and make the problem interesting.
Temporal Structure
I assume that regulators cannot commit ex ante to setting a certain quantity q. The
managers are free to choose capital structure and this decision is less flexible than the
regulatory choice. The regulator can therefore adjust the quantity q to the choice of capital
structure of the firm. The regulator is not constrained ex post by the recovery of the
investment cost, but the continuation decision. The resulting order of moves is as follows:
At stage 0, the managers choose whether to execute the project and they offer a contract
to the financial market that determines capital structure. At stage 1, investors accept or
reject the proposal of the managers to finance the project. At stage 2, the regulator chooses
the regulated quantity and the payoffs for all the agents are determined, but they are not
collectable at this stage. At stage 3, the controlling investors decide whether to liquidate
the firm. Finally, payoffs are collected at stage 4. I depict the order of moves in Figure 1.
The solution concept employed is subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE). The game is of finite
length, allowing to find the equilibrium by simple application of backward induction.
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3 Equilibrium Capital Structure and Regulation
I proceed in this section by considering the different financial contracts that can be proposed
by the managers and determine the equilibrium quantities, investment levels, income and
welfare associated with these contracts. I identify in this way the optimal capital structure
for managers and compare the equilibrium welfare with the regulator’s optimal welfare level.
It is instructive to consider first what would be the resulting outcome if managers hoarded
enough cash and they decided to fully fund the project. After the investment is committed,
the regulator sets its preferred quantity qr, knowing that it ensures the continuation of the
firm, as Um(qr) = π(qr) + π + B −K > 0. The downweighting of the firm’s income by the
regulator does not lead to a critical hold-up problem, as the managers still find in their best
interest to carry out the investment in the firm. The welfare level computed by the regulator
attains its maximal value W (qr). I consider next the effects of the different forms of external
financing with respect to this benchmark.
3.1 Non-voting Equity
The issuance of non-voting equity to cover the gap S ≡ K − A would keep the original
managers in control of the firm and the regulator will act accordingly by setting the ex
post regulated quantity to qr. If external shareholders appropriate a share se of verifiable
income, the managers prefer continuation, as B ≥ L− π(qr)− π > 0 implies B > (1− se) ·
(L− π(qr)− π). The regulator will have no incentive to distort quantity qr.
The shareholders that keep the newly issued non-voting equity know that they will receive
at most π + π(qr) from the investment, so they will refuse to provide the necessary funds
if S > π + π(qr). Conditional on the cash available in the firm, the following scenarios are
possible:
(a) If S  π + π(qr), the firm is funded. The managers receive Um(qr). The new
shareholders receive a zero net payoff from the assumption of perfectly competitive financial
markets. The social welfare evaluated by the regulator is at its highest possible value W (qr).
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(b) If S > π + π(qr), the firm is not funded. There is no surplus, so managers, potential
shareholders and consumers receive all a zero payoff. In particular, non voting equity can
not be raised for any level of cash needs S > 0 if the weight α on the firm’s income is low
and π + π(qr) ≤ 0.
Note also that competitive lending implies that the managers would be indifferent between
issuing non-voting equity for a value π+π(qr) and fully funding the project if they had enough
funds to cover the investment, i. e., S = 0. I summarize these results in the following lemma:
Lemma 1. The maximal amount of funds that the firm can raise in external non-voting
equity is the maximum of π+π(qr) and zero. This financial instrument involves no distortion
in the optimal regulatory policy.
Proof. See discussion above .
3.2 Debt
Regulator’s policy
The use of debt creates the possibility of bankruptcy. However, the regulator has the
ability to control perfectly regulated income, so it can also control the events of bankruptcy
and liquidation. The question is whether the regulator has incentives to restrict quantity
qr as a response to an increase in the leverage of the firm. A first observation is that for a
level of debt below π(qr) + π, debt is equivalent to non-voting equity and Lemma 1 applies.
For levels of debt D above π(qr) + π, the use of the regulator’s preferred quantity qr leads
to bankruptcy, as D > π(qr) + π, and to liquidation, as L > π(qr) + π. The debtholders do
not internalize the foregone consumer surplus and initiate liquidation to recover the biggest
possible fraction of their investment. In Section 2, I assumed that the regulator can avoid
liquidation by restricting production to q∗L and that he will strictly prefer to induce this
distortion over the liquidation outcome. As long as debt D is lower than the liquidation
value L, it is preferable for the regulator to avoid bankruptcy, as it requires a smaller welfare
loss.
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Capital Structure and the Value of the Firm
Given the strategy of the regulator discussed above, I consider the use of debt by managers
with differing cash needs. If cash needs S ≡ K −A are exactly covered with debt financing,
D = S, I have the following scenarios:
(a) If S  π(qr) + π, an amount of debt D = S is equivalent to non-voting equity and
the results on the value of the firm in the previous subsection apply.
(b) If π(qr) + π < S  L, the regulator is forced to restrict the regulated quantity
q to qD ≡ max q such that π(q) + π = D = S. This leaves a level of utility equal to
Um(qD) = π(qD) + π + B −K to the managers. The debtholders receive a net zero payoff.
The welfare value for the regulator is below its optimal level: W (qD) < W (qr).
(c) If L < S, it is not possible to finance the project with all debt since debtholders
obtain a maximum ex post repayment L. The excess of debt over liquidation value does not
force further increases in regulated income, as the regulator only needs to make controlling
debtholders indifferent between continuation and liquidation. If cash needs are at that high
level, the hold-up problem persists and prevents a socially beneficial investment.
The use of debt reduces the cash contributions of managers, as it forces the regulator to
increase regulated income π(q) and cover ex-post a higher fraction of the investment cost K.
The strategic value of debt can lead to the socially excessive use of this financial instrument
even if net investment needs S are strictly lower than the liquidation value L. If S < L,
the managers of the firm must decide whether to limit the debt issue to financial needs S or
expand leverage with an additional amount of debt L− S:
(d) If debt is limited to financial needs S, the value that the managers achieve is equal
to π(qS) + π + B −K for π(qS) + π = max(π(qr) + π, S). The max(., .) term captures that
financial needs might be lower than the level of income preferred by the regulator, π(qr)+π,
and impose no distortion. For S > π(qr) + π, the distortion in qr still implies a welfare loss
of size W (qr)−W (qS).
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(e) If the managers increase debt up to D = L, the fraction of investment costs covered
by the debtholders is maximal and the regulator is forced to restrict quantity to q∗L. The
managers receive then π(q∗L) + π+B −K. The welfare loss for the regulator is greater than
in the case where debt only covers financial needs: W (qr)−W (q∗L) > W (qr)−W (qS) ≥ 0 for
S < L.
The managers will then choose to fund the project with an amount of debt in excess of
the actual cash needs S and retain a higher fraction of their own cash reserves A. In fact, I
could modify the relative ranking of liquidation value and investment cost so that L > K.
In this case, the managers would borrow more than the amount required to cover the cost
of investment and use the extra cash to pay themselves a dividend, as the regulator will be
forced to compensate investors to avoid liquidation. This creates a rationale to limit the
use of debt by regulated firms to the needs of investment. Howe (1982), Phillips (1988) and
Taggart (1985) describe the historical development of capital restrictions on public utilities
in the United States. I gather all these observations in the following proposition for the
equilibrium choice of debt.
Proposition 1. If available financial contracts include non-voting equity and debt, the
value of the managers’s position in the firm is maximized by issuing an amount of debt equal
to liquidation value L. This level of leverage also implies:
(i) An increase in financing capacity from max(π(qr)+π,0) to L, as the hold-up problem
is attenuated.
(ii) An increase in welfare when S > π(qr) + π, as the socially valuable firm can be
financed for lower amounts of cash reserves.
(iii) An excess amount of debt from the perspective of the regulator of size equal to L−S
is raised when cash needs fall short of the liquidation value, S < L.
Proof. See discussion above .
The regulator might use an initial transfer to cover the investment needs of the firm
rather than distorting the quantity q towards the monopoly level. If these transfers were
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available, the relative reliance of the regulator on each of these instruments would depend
on the comparison of the public cost of the quantity distortions at t = 2 and the use of
public funds at t = 1. If the managers posses private information with respect to the cash
available, or they can divert part of these reserves, a new agency cost arises, as the regulator
must offer incentive compatible subsidies and quantities.
Combinations of non-voting equity and debt above π(qr) + π are unfeasible. I denote
non-voting equity as E and consider first the scenario with E + D > π(qr) + π. Debt is
senior to equity and it has a priority claim over the income of the firm. If D > π(qr) + π ,
the regulator sets π(qD) = D− π and no surplus is left for equity holders. If D < π(qr) + π,
the surplus left is still insufficient to cover the funds provided by equity holders. There is no
increase in financing capacity by using a mix of debt and non-voting equity.
3.3 Voting Equity
There are several assumptions that can be applied to the private benefits of external equity
holders with control rights. I will focus on the case in which these investors derive no private
benefit and the managers maintain their private benefits B as long as there is no liquidation.
For example, pension funds and mutual funds usually stay away from the daily operations,
and managers can keep the benefits associated with control. In this case, the use of voting
equity would force the regulator to set quantity q to q∗L in the exact same way as a debt
position equal to L. External equity holders try to maximize their share of verifiable income
and require a continuation value L to maintain the firm in operation.
The transfer of control to external investors might require only the issue of a small
amount of equity depending on the initial position of managers and external equity holders
(assigning a golden share to an external investor would also suffice). However, the need to
finance S ≡ K − A remains and the managers can raise this quantity from a mix of debt,
non-voting equity and voting equity. If control is transferred to external equity holders, the
composition of the mix will have no further effect on financing capacity, as the liquidation
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value remains at L.10 The different claimholders will divide π(q∗L) + π according to their
relative contributions to the liabilities L.
Lemma 2. The transfer of control to external investors through the issue of new voting
equity produces the same social welfare and value of the firm as an amount of debt L. As
long as control is transferred to external equity holders, all the combinations of financial
instruments used to cover S imply the same value of the firm and social welfare.
Proof. See discussion above .
The result above hinges on the assumption that the control of the board by external
equity holders does not deprive the managers of the firm from their private benefits. I could
assume instead that external equity holders can either appropriate the private benefits of
managers or suppress them altogether. I consider these scenarios in turn:
(a) If the new controlling shareholders acquire private benefits B, they have the same
incentives to continue in business as the former managers and the regulator will set the
regulated quantity to qr. The results of Lemma 1 on the value of the firm and the regulator’s
measure of welfare will apply. However, the financing capacity of the firm is increased to
π(qr) + π+B, as external investors can appropriate greater benefits. This scenario assumes
that voting equity makes B verifiable and it therefore simplifies the investment problem.
(b) If the new controlling shareholders suppress private benefits, the regulator is still
forced to set regulated income π(q∗L) = L − π. The results in Proposition 1 in terms of
financing capacity and welfare are maintained. However, the value of the firm for managers
decreases as the private benefits B are lost. This value would equal now π(q∗L) + π −K ≡
L −K ≤ 0. The managers would therefore opt not to start the project if voting equity of
this class is the only financial instrument available.
10The study of the optimal number of lenders is a separate topic outside of the scope of the current article.
See Bolton and Scharfstein (1996) or Thakor (1996) for examples in this literature.
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3.4 Bankruptcy and Reorganization of the Firm
The liquidation of the firm’s assets is the basic bankruptcy procedure considered in this
article. The analysis would not be substantially altered if reorganization is detrimental to
consumers. However, an alternative scenario arises when I consider reorganization neutral
or beneficial to consumers such as an internal turnaround or expansion in the unregulated
sector. This process might be initiated under the filing of Chapter 11 or be the consequence
of the transfer of control to external shareholders. The loss of control by the managers turns
them into subordinates of the controlling administrators.
The reorganization will be modeled as an increase in verifiable income R and a reduction
of private benefits to φ (B) < B that is not voluntarily adopted by the managers, i.e.,
R − (B − φ (B)) < 0. This condition can be rationalized as the outcome of the delegated
implementation of reforms in the firm by managers. Reform implementation can be analyzed
in a principal-agent setting where the controlling administrators offer to the managers wages
and probabilities of contract renewal contingent on the success of reform.11
For a given amount of debt D and regulated income, the investors can now use the
reorganization process to increase verifiable income in an amount R at stage t = 3.12 The
regulator anticipates then that a lower distortion in q is needed to avoid the liquidation of a
firm that goes into bankruptcy. With internal reorganization, the quantity required to avoid
liquidation for debt level D is qrD and it is defined by D − π −R = π(qrD) < π(qnrD ) = D − π
and qrD > q
nr
D , where q
nr
D is the quantity without internal turn-around. The investors are still
able to collect their claim in full with the new process, but a portion of this claim is covered
now by reorganization gains rather than regulated income.
The term R increases the critical level of debt above which the regulator is forced to
restrict q below qr from π(qr) + π to π(qr) + π + R.13 If π(qr) + π + R < L, the maximum
11This extended analysis is completed in an appendix available from the author.
12I assume that the investors’s policy or the legal regime favors reorganization over liquidation if both
processes allow to collect a given claim in full.
13If R enters (1), the regulator might choose q > qr for D ≤ π(qr)+π to gain αR at the cost of a moderate
distortion in q. This would not alter the argument in the text as, in this case, D ≤ π(qr) + π is dominated
for managers by an issue of non voting equity E = D, and it is not an equilibrium capital structure.
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feasible level of debt remains at L, as the regulator still needs only to avoid liquidation
rather than bankruptcy. If π(qr) + π+R > L, the firm can increase leverage further than in
the base case as the total allowed verifiable income is higher. In all cases, the total funding
capacity of the firm is not decreased by the introduction of this process. The presence of
reorganization also improves consumer welfare through smaller reductions in the quantity q
for any level of debt D in the range [π(qr) + π, L].
Reorganization does not however Pareto dominate inaction, as it involves a reduction in
the value of the position of managers of size equal to R−(B − φ (B)) < 0. The managers will
effectively compare the value of their position in the firm with and without reorganization.
For D > π(qr) + π, the regulator will allow the firm to reorganize in order to minimize
distortions in q. The maximum level of external financing that avoids reorganization is an
issue of non-voting equity of size π(qr)+π, and the value of the firm under this restriction is
V0 = π(qr)+π+B−K. All debt levels above π(qr)+π involve the same reorganization cost and
the only marginal effect of increases in leverage beyond this level is a weakly higher regulated
income.14 The maximum value with reorganization will then equal VL(r) = L+ φ (B)−K if
π(qr) + π + R ≤ L or VR(r) = π(qr) + π + R + φ (B) −K if π(qr) + π + R > L. In all the
scenarios, the managers are hurt with respect to the case with liquidation: VL = L+B−K.
To see this,
(a) VL − V0 = L− π(qr)− π > 0.
(b) VL − VL(r) = B − φ (B) > 0.
(c) VL − VR(r) = (VL − V0) + (V0 − VR(r)) = (L− π(qr)− π) + (B − φ (B)−R) > 0.
If the cash needs are such that S > π(qr) + π, the managers can not finance the firm
without engaging in reorganization. The managers will then be willing to continue the
business of the firm only if max(VL(r), VR(r)) > 0. If cash needs are moderate, S ≤ π(qr)+π,
managers might choose not to leverage as V0−VR(r) = B−φ (B)−R > 0, and V0−VL(r) can
14Regulated income is only weakly higher because high reorganization benefits, π(qr) + π + R > L, can
leave the regulator unconstrained.
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also be positive for high reorganization costs: V0 − VL(r) = π(qr) + π − L+ (B − φ (B)) > 0
if B − φ (B) > L− π(qr) + π. These considerations are summarized below:
Proposition 2. The possibility of reorganization in the bankruptcy procedure:
(i) increases (at least weakly) the maximum financing capacity of the firm.
(ii) increases the regulated quantity q, consumer surplus and the regulator’s welfare mea-
sure if the firm is financed.
(iii) diminishes the value of the firm for the managers to max
(
V0, VL(r), VR(r)
)
< VL for
a firm’s value VL with the liquidation only regime.
(iv) might induce managers to discontinue the firm for severe enough reductions of B.
Proof. See discussion above .
4 A Model with Income Risk
I introduce in this section a random component in the income of the firm and explore how this
risk affects regulation and the choice of capital structure. I consider two income states πH and
πL for the unregulated sector with probabilities β and 1−β such that π = β ·πH+(1−β)·πL.
This income shock is realized after the choice of the regulated quantity (stage 2 in the base
model) so both regulator’s policy on q and private investment decisions are taken under risk.
The decision of the regulator on q implies a choice of the expected return of the investment
of the firm. The variance of that return originates from the variability in unregulated income.
These assumptions are reasonable if the regulator can not postpone the decision on q
until the unregulated income is determined and it can commit to this decision. In practice,
this regulated decision process could be sustained by a restrictive legal regime that limits
the possibility to review regulation over time. The new timing is detailed in Figure 2.
A priory, the presence of risk might limit the opportunistic behavior of the regulator, as
the incentives to avoid liquidation when unregulated income is low lead to a higher regulated
income. However, the possibility of a high realization of unregulated income πH also allows
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to limit the support to the firm to that income realization and allow liquidation for low
unregulated income πL. The regulator’s policy will depend on the specific characteristics of
the regulated and unregulated sectors.
At the end of this section, I consider the possibility of adjusting ex-post the choice of
quantity q to the income realization in the unregulated sector. The regulator can then
adjust q to avoid both liquidation and excessive transfers to the firm for a given level of
debt D. However, the managers will know that the regulator has a greater ability to control
liquidation and they can increase the leverage of the firm. This lack of commitment can
benefit regulators that have a strong preference for continuation of the firm and allow high
regulated income when forced to choose q before the realization of unregulated income. I
detail next the adaptation of the remaining elements of the basic model:
The Regulator
The welfare function of the regulator in (1) is unaltered, but the unregulated income of
the firm is now random. Consumer surplus from the unregulated sector is also assumed to be
random, taking the value CSH with probability β and CSL with probability 1− β. There is
no strong argument to sign the relation between consumer surplus and income, as variation
in unregulated income might correspond to demand, competition and cost shocks. I assume
that CSL < CSH to focus the presentation, but this assumption is not essential.
The regulator is willing to invest and allow the continuation of the firm even if low
unregulated income πL is realized with certainty and the monopoly price is charged:
α · (πL + π(qm)) + CS(qm) + CSL > α ·K > α · L (4)
The Managers and the Investors
The managers are assumed to continue the operations of the firm even if low unregulated
income πL is realized and regulated income is set at qr: πL + π(qr)−L+B > 0.15 External
15If this assumption is changed, e. g., πL + π(qr) < L − B < πL + π(qm), the regulator also restricts q
when managers are in control. The use of debt implies still higher restrictions in q but the relative distortion
and increase in the value of the firm are smaller.
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investors are willing to enter liquidation if quantity q is limited to qr, so πL+ π(qr)−L < 0.
I also assume that the income from monopoly in the regulated sector ensures that external
investors do not choose liquidation. Hence, I have πL + π(qm)− L > 0.
With regard to the investment decision, I maintain that the managers would be willing
to carry out the project at the optimal regulated quantity qr if they had enough cash at
hand. That is π + π(qr) +B −K > 0.
4.1 Regulator’s Policy
Given a leveraged firm with debt D > πL + π(qr) and an income realization in {πL, πH},
the choice of regulated income π(q) determines whether the firm continues in operation.
The regulator can choose between supporting the firm at both states {HL}, only at the
high state {H} or allowing liquidation at both states {∅}. The regulatory choice trades off
the benefit of ensuring continuation and the cost of inducing a quantity distortion in the
regulated sector.
For levels of debt below L, avoiding bankruptcy implies a lower quantity distortion than
avoiding liquidation and the regulator will choose the former option. The quantities qDh and
qDl required to avoid bankruptcy and liquidation for a level of debt D ≤ L at each income
state are implicitly defined by:
π(qDh ) = max(D − πH , π(qr)) (5)
π(qDl ) = max(D − πL, π(qr))
The fact that πH > πL implies that qDl ≤ qDh and leads regulated income closer to the
monopoly level for an income realization πL. I apply the implicit function theorem to the
constraints in (5) in the range D > πH + π(qr) and find that an increase in the debt level D
will lead to a higher reduction in q at the low income state πL:
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∂qDl /∂D =
1
π′(qDl )
<
1
π′(qDh )
= ∂qDh /∂D < 0 (6)
from qDl < q
D
h and the concavity of π(q). If debt D is at a low level, D < πL+π(qr), marginal
increases in D do not affect the probability of liquidation and have no effect on the regulated
quantity q: ∂qDl /∂D = 0 and ∂q
D
h /∂D = 0. Lemma 3 gathers these considerations:
Lemma 3. The differences in the restricted quantities Δq ≡ qDh −qDl and in the marginal
effect of an increase in debt ∂qDh /∂D − ∂qDl /∂D both increase (at least weakly) with the
difference between the two realizations of unregulated income Δπ ≡ πH − πL.
Proof. It follows immediately from (5) that increasing (decreasing) πH (πL) leads to
a weak increase (decrease) in qDh (q
D
l ). Concavity of π(q) then implies that the difference
∂qDh /∂D − ∂qDl /∂D increases (at least weakly).
With this characterization of quantity distortions, I proceed to the analysis of the support
policy of the regulator. For debt level D ≤ L and quantities qDh and qDl defined by (5), the
net gain in the regulator’s welfare measure from avoiding bankruptcy and liquidation at the
high profit state {H} versus allowing liquidation at both states {∅} is given by:
ΔW (H,∅, D) ≡ β · (α · [π(qDh ) + πH ] + CSH + CS(qDh )− α · L)
that is equal to the additional welfare from continuation at the high income state πH . There
is no difference in welfare at the low income state πL as the firm is liquidated under both
{H} and {∅}. For D ≤ L, the quantity qDh is above monopoly level qm, and it is immediate
that the regulator prefers continuation by the assumption in (4).
The net effect in the regulator’s welfare measure of avoiding bankruptcy and liquidation
at both states {HL} versus limiting support only to the state with high income {H} can
not be signed so easily. This difference is given by the expression:
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ΔW (HL,H,D) ≡ (1− β) · (α · (πL + π(qDl )− L) + CS(qDl ) + CSL) (7)
−β · (α · π(qDh ) + CS(qDh )− α · π(qDl )− CS(qDl ))
The first term in (7) is equal to the additional regulator’s welfare from continuation at
the low income state πL. As the debt level D increases, this term unequivocally decreases,
as the regulator’s support of the firm at the state πL requires a greater quantity distortion.
The second term in (7) represents the welfare loss at state πH from choosing qDl rather
than qDh , and it also decreases as the debt level D increases. This follows from the next
two observations: (a) the marginal quantity variation ∂qDl /∂D at state πL is smaller (more
negative) than ∂qDh /∂D by Lemma 3 and (b) the function α · π(q) + CS(q) is concave and
its first derivative increases as q is reduced below qr. Consequently,
∂[α · π(qDh ) + CS(qDh )]/∂qDh · ∂qDh /∂D − ∂[α · π(qDl ) + CS(qDl )]/∂qDl · ∂qDl /∂D > 0
As the debt level increases, (7) declines monotonically and there exists a maximum debt
level Dcrit ≤ L such that the regulator prefers (at least weakly) the policy {HL} over {H},
i.e., ΔW (HL,H,Dcrit) ≥ 0, if and only if D ≤ Dcrit. I can then define the maximum feasible
debt level D∗ that avoids the regulator’s switch from policy {HL} to {H} as:16
D∗ = max
(
0, Dcrit
)
The optimal policy of the regulator is to support the firm at both income states {HL} if
D ≤ D∗ and limit support to the high income state {H} if D > D∗. Given the monotonicity
of ΔW (HL,H,D), the evaluation of (7) at L is enough to determine whether D∗ < L.
If ΔW (HL,H,L) ≥ 0, then there is no Dcrit < L such that ΔW (HL,H,Dcrit) ≤ 0 and
16The critical level D∗ can be zero if the regulator has preference for expropriation with π(qr) + πL < 0.
It is not possible to issue a negative amount of debt and D = 0 can be above π(qr) + πL and Dcrit.
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D∗ = max (0, L) = L. On the contrary, ΔW (HL,H,L) < 0, implies that critical level
Dcrit is below L and D∗ < L. The maximum feasible debt level remains L as the regulator
still needs to avoid liquidation rather than bankruptcy to ensure the continuation at a given
income state πL or πH .
The critical levelD∗ is specific to the regulatory environment and it is an implicit function
of all the parameters of the model. The following lemma summarizes some comparative
statics:
Lemma 4. For a given liquidation value L, D∗ is (at least weakly):
(i) decreasing in the high income state πH .
(ii) increasing in the low income state πL.
(iii) decreasing in a spread Δπ ≡ πH−πL over the level of income π such that πL < π <
πH and the reduction of D∗ from taking such spread is higher than the one resulting from a
deterioration of profits Δπ ≡ π − πL for πL < π < πH .
(iv) decreasing in the probability of the high income state β.
(v) increasing in the regulator’s weight α if D∗ → L.
(vi) increasing in the consumer surplus in the low income state CSL.
Proof. See the Appendix B for a detailed proof .
4.2 The Capital Structure and Value of the Firm
I focus on the use of debt under the bankruptcy process oriented to liquidation. Reorga-
nization relaxes the income constraints at every income state in line with the results in
Proposition 2 and the financing capacity associated to non-voting equity is not affected by
the introduction of income risk. If managers issue non-voting equity, the regulator antic-
ipates that they will keep control of the liquidation decision at both income states. The
regulator will have no incentives to distort q and increase regulated income. Risk neutral
investors will anticipate a maximum payment π + π(qr) and they will not contribute equity
financing above this amount. The logic of Section 3.1 remains valid.
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The value of debt is however altered by the presence of risk. For example, given a critical
value D∗ = L, the regulator guarantees continuation of the firm at the income state πL even
if the debt of the firm is as high as L. The managers have no incentive to choose D < L
and the value of the firm for D = L increases with respect to the scenario with no risk by
the expected excess regulated income β ·Δπ in the high income state. I will use for the rest
of the section the notation VHL,D and VH ,D to denote the value of the firm for managers
if continuation is allowed at both states {πL, πH} or only at the high income state πH and
firm’s debt is D. For D = D∗ = L, the value of the firm is then:
VHL,L = π + π(q
L
l ) +B −K
where π(qLl ) = L− πL > L− π. With respect to the scenario with no risk, the change in the
value of the firm is π + π(qLl )− L = β ·Δπ, as stated above. The rest of the section studies
the managers’s optimal choice of debt level and the firm’s value.
Optimal Level of Debt
I characterize first the evolution of the value of the firm as a function of debt for D∗ < L.
I assume throughout that the managers have enough cash to fund the project in combination
with debt D, i. e., D + A ≥ K. I turn back to the relation between the choice of the level
of debt and the capital needs S ≡ K − A at the end of the section.
(a) For debt level D such that 0 ≤ πL + π(qr) < D ≤ D∗, the value of the firm is:
β · (πH + π(qDl )−D +B) + (1− β) · (πL + π(qDl )−D +B)− (K −D)
or, more compactly,
VHL,D = β · (Δπ) +D +B −K (8)
The value VHL,D increases with D as the regulator restricts q to avoid liquidation at
income state πL. For D ≤ πL+π(qr), debt and non-voting equity are equivalent instruments.
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Managers can achieve the full equity value with no risk π + π(qr) + B −K by issuing debt
D  πL+π(qr) < π+π(qr). An equity issue of size E such that πL+π(qr) < E ≤ π+π(qr)
leads to a smaller increase in the value of the firm than an issue of debt of the same size.
(b) At debt level D such that 0 ≤ πL + π(qr) < D∗ < D = D∗ + , for  → 0, there
is a discontinuous decline in the value of the firm, as the regulator stops supporting the
continuation of the firm at the low income state πL. For D∗ > 0, the reduction in the value
of the firm for a change from D∗ to D∗ +  is:
β · (Δπ) + (1− β) · (π(qD∗l ) + πL +B − L)
This expression includes the expected excess income β · (Δπ) earned at the high income
state πH for D ≤ D∗ and the managers’s loss from liquidation at the low income state πL.
Managers have therefore no incentive to increment debt marginally over D∗.
(c) For values of debt D such that 0 ≤ πL + π(qr) < D∗ < D < L, the value of the
firm increases as the regulator is forced to restrict quantity q to sustain the firm at the high
income state πH . The value of the firm is now:
VH,D = β · (D +B) + (1− β) · L−K
The managers prefer L over any level of debt in the interval (D∗, L): VH,L > VH,D for all
D > D∗. If D∗ < L, the continuous choice over D is simplified into a discrete choice between
critical levels D∗, for a value of the firm VHL,D∗ , and L, for a value of the firm VH,L. For
D∗ = L, the managers simply choose D = D∗ = L and collect firm’s value VHL,L.
(d) If D∗ = 0, any positive level of debt will lead the regulator to support the firm
exclusively at the income state πH . The value of the firm at D = D∗ = 0, which implies full
equity financing, is then:
VHL,0 = π + π(qr) +B −K (9)
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For a debt level D = D∗ +  > D∗ = 0, for  → 0, there is again a discontinuous change in
the value of the firm, which is given in this case by:
β ·max(− π(qr)− πH , 0) + (1− β) · (π(qr) + πL +B − L)
where the first term might be positive as result of avoiding a possibly negative income
π(qr)+πH at income state πH . However, it is still the case that VH,L > VH,D for all D > D∗,
as the only marginal effect of increasing the debt level above D∗ = 0 is to force higher
regulated income at state πH .
Valuation Impact of Income Risk
I will compare the optimal value of the firm in this section with the value with no risk,
VL ≡ L + B −K. The case D∗ = L was already described at the beginning of the section.
For D∗ < L, the following value comparisons hold:
(a) The value of the firm at full leverage decreases with the introduction of income risk.
The possibility of liquidation at the low income state πL imposes the loss of private benefits
B in this event. Formally,
VL − VH,L = (L+B −K)− (L+ β ·B −K) = (1− β) ·B > 0
(b) The difference in value of the firm with leverage D∗ in the scenario with income risk,
VHL,D∗ , compared with the value of the firm in the scenario with no risk, VL, is:
VL − VHL,D∗ = (L+B −K)− (D∗ +B + β ·Δπ −K)
This expression is positive if and only if the expected excess income β · Δπ is not high
relative to the reduction in the debt level from L to D∗. That is, D∗ < L− β ·Δπ.
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on the relative size of the critical level of debt D∗. I calculate the difference:
VH,L − VHL,D∗ = (L+ β ·B −K)− (D∗ +B + β ·Δπ −K)
= L− (D∗ + (1− β) ·B + β ·Δπ)
that implies that VH,L−VHL,D∗ > 0 if and only if D∗ < L−(1−β) ·B−β ·Δπ. The managers
are better off constraining debt D to D∗ if the difference L − D∗ is not big relative to the
benefits of excess income β ·Δπ and protection of private benefits (1− β) ·B for D = D∗.
(d) In case that D∗ = 0, the above value comparisons must be computed using (9) to
obtain VHL,D∗ = VHL,0. Then, I have that:
VH,L − VHL,0 = (L+ β ·B −K)− (π + π(qr) +B −K)
= L− π − π(qr)− (1− β) ·B
VL − VHL,0 = (L+B −K)− (π + π(qr) +B −K)
= L− π − π(qr) > 0
The managers that limit debt to D∗ = 0 are worse off than in the scenario with no risk,
as VL−VHL,0 > 0, but they might still choose to limit leverage to zero if the private benefits
are high enough so VH,L − VHL,0 < 0 and the financing needs can be covered with internal
funds or non-voting equity.
The common lesson of the different value comparisons is that the managers will benefit
from the introduction of risk if the critical debt level D∗ is sufficiently high. I summarize
the results in the following proposition:17
Proposition 3. The introduction of a spread Δπ in unregulated income leads to the
following capital structure choices and value of the firm if managers can freely choose the
level of leverage. For D∗ > π(qr) + πL > 0, the value comparison yields:
17The cases in Proposition 3 correspond to different sets of non-linear conditions on the parameters of the
model, as D∗ and the bounds are a function of these parameters. The different cases are exclusive.
(c) In the scenario with risk, the sign of the difference VH,L − VHL,D∗ will again depend
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(i) The optimal amount of leverage equals L to attain a value VH,L if and only if D∗ <
L− (1−β) ·B−β ·Δπ. This implies a reduction in firm’s value with respect to the scenario
with no risk as VH,L < VL.
(ii) The optimal amount of leverage equals D∗ to attain a value VHL,D∗ < VL if and only
if L− (1− β) ·B − β ·Δπ ≤ D∗ < L− β ·Δπ.
(iii) The optimal amount of leverage equals D∗ to attain a value VHL,D∗ ≥ VL if and only
if L− β ·Δπ ≤ D∗ < L.
(iv) The optimal amount of leverage equals L to attain a value VHL,L > VL if and only if
L = D∗.
For D∗ = 0 > π(qr) + πL, the value comparison yields:
(v) The optimal amount of leverage equals D∗ = 0 to attain a value VHL,0 < VL if and
only if L− π − π(qr) ≤ (1− β) ·B.
(vi) The optimal amount of leverage equals L to obtain VH,L < VL if and only if L−π−
π(qr) > (1− β) ·B.
Proof. See discussion above .
The case (iii) is illustrated graphically in Figure 3. This case is interesting as income
risk forces the managers to limit debt below liquidation value L, but still VHL,D∗ ≥ VL as
average regulated income is kept at a level high enough to avoid liquidation at income state
πL. Figure 4 illustrates the case (ii), where the reduction from L to D∗ is high enough to
have VHL,D∗ < VL.
The managers will not be able to attain the optimal value VHL,D∗ in cases (ii) and (iii)
if financing constraints are severe enough: D∗ < S < L. The managers might want to limit
the issuance of debt to D∗ to avoid the risk of losing private benefits B, but they might lack
the cash to cover the gap between D∗ and S ≡ K−A. The introduction of a spread Δπ does
not alter the maximum funding capacity equal to L and the presence of cash needs superior
to D∗ can lead to the choice of a capital structure with D = L that is suboptimal from the
perspective of the managers. Alternatively, it is possible that S < D∗ ≤ L and, as in the
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case with no risk in Section 3, the managers will choose to fund the project with excessive
debt, D = D∗ > S, in order to retain a higher fraction of their own cash reserves A.
The use of voting-equity still forces the regulator to set regulated income at a level such
that the verifiable continuation value exceeds the liquidation value L. This form of security
is then equivalent to the issuance of an amount of debt L. The managers will avoid the use
of voting equity in favor of a limited issuance of debt D∗ if VHL,D∗ ≥ VHL,L and they have
enough internal funds.
The specific case of Proposition 3 that holds in an industry depends on the combination
of all the parameters describing the market and firm conditions. However, it is possible
to find some simple relations for some parameters. As B → ∞, the scenarios (i) and (vi)
in Proposition 3 are ruled out. The value of private benefits is too high for managers to
allow a positive probability of liquidation. If CSL → ∞, D∗ → L and the scenario (iv) in
Proposition 3 must hold. The regulator is forced to increase average regulated income to
avoid a high loss of consumer surplus. In general, numerical analysis is required to find the
optimal capital structure and regulatory policy in a given industry. Appendix C presents a
simple example with linear demand and quadratic costs.
4.3 No Commitment
I modify here the assumptions in the previous parts of Section 4 to allow the regulator
and the firm to adjust the quantity q after the income shock is realized. Given an income
realization in {πL, πH}, the regulator will face the same problem as in Section 3. For a given
realization in {πL, πH}, it is then possible to adjust regulated income to cover exactly the
difference between debt payments D and unregulated income. There is no longer need to
allow excess regulated income at the high income state πH .
The managers will anticipate the perfect control of the regulator over the events of bank-
ruptcy and liquidation. Managers will also anticipate that the regulator will not increase
allowed regulated income unless the capital structure of the firm creates a real threat of
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liquidation. The incentives of managers to increase debt up to liquidation value L stay
then constant with respect to the scenario with no risk in Section 3 and firm’s value equals
VL = L+B −K.
Lemma 5. If the regulator can not commit to a particular policy on q before the income
realization in {πL, πH} is known, the equilibrium capital structure, firm’s value and regulatory
policy are determined by application of the model with no risk in sections 2 and 3.
Proof. See discussion above .
Proposition 3 allows to evaluate the change in firm’s value when the regulatory regime
with commitment is abandoned, as this firm’s value is guaranteed to equal VL under no
commitment. The switch to the regime with no commitment hurts the managers if they are
able to maintain high leverage under commitment and still ensure the continuation of the
firm in both income states, as in cases (iii) and (iv) in Proposition 3.
Lack of commitment allows the regulator to ensure the continuation of the firm and
matches regulated income to financial needs exactly. The cost for the regulator of the
flexibility that comes with the lack of commitment is that managers will increase the leverage
of the firm. The magnitude of this cost will be small if the critical value D∗ under the
commitment regime is close to L. I analyze next these welfare changes in more detail.
Welfare Implications
I compare here the welfare measure of the regulator when it can commit to a quantity
q at t = 2, and when it is able to adjust q after the income realization at t = 3. The expected
welfare measure of a regulator that can not commit is:
WNC = β ·
(
α · (π(qLh ) + πH −K)+ CSH + CS(qLh ))
+(1− β) · (α · (π(qLl ) + πL −K)+ CSL + CS(qLl ))
or, more conveniently,
WNC = β ·WH(qLh ) + (1− β) ·WL(qLl )
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where WH(.) and WL(.) are increasing functions of q in [qm, qr] and adopt the form in (1) for
given consumer surplus and income realizations in {CSL, CSH} and {πL, πH}. The quantity
levels qLh and q
L
l solve the system in (5) for D = L, as the mangers choose maximum leverage
when the regulator can not commit. I use the notation WHL,D and WH,D to denote the
welfare measure of the regulator if commitment is possible, continuation is allowed at states
{HL} and {H} and debt is D.
Absence of commitment is optimal for the regulator if the managers would choose a very
high level of debt even if the regulator can commit ex ante. If managers choose D = D∗ = L
when the regulator has commitment power, the welfare comparison yields:
WNC −WHL,L = β ·
(
WH(q
L
h )−WH(qLl )
)
> 0 (10)
from the fact that WH(.) is increasing in q and qLh > q
L
l . In this case, lack of commitment
allows the regulator to support the continuation of the firm at income state πH with a smaller
quantity distortion. If managers choose D = L > D∗:
WNC −WH,L = (1− β) ·
(
WL(q
L
l )− α · (L−K)
) ≥ 0
from the assumption that α · (π(q) + πL) + CSL + CS(q)− α · L > 0 for q ∈ [qm, qr].
Commitment can benefit the regulator if it reduces the strategic use of debt by managers
to a level D = D∗ < L that is sufficiently low. The welfare criterion to evaluate the two
regimes is:
WNC −WHL,D∗ = β ·
(
WH(q
L
h )−WH(qD
∗
l )
)
(11)
+(1− β) · (WL(qLl )−WL(qD∗l ))
Lack of commitment restricts quantity q at state πL and the second term in the above
expression is clearly negative from the fact that WL(.) is increasing in [qm, qr] and qLl < q
D∗
l
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from (5) and D∗ < L. If the first term is non-positive, commitment would be immediately
optimal in this case. Monotonicity of WH(.) implies thatWH(qLh )−WH(qD∗l ) < 0 if and only
if qLh < q
D∗
l :
(a) If D∗ allows the regulator to set qD
∗
l = qr ≥ qLh , WH(qLh ) −WH(qD∗l ) ≤ 0 and the
regulator benefits from commitment. In particular, commitment allows a pro-liquidation
regulator with D∗ = 0 to prevent the strategic use of leverage by managers with high private
benefits, as in case (v) in Proposition 3.
(b) If D∗ constrains the regulator to set qD
∗
l < qr, WH(q
L
h ) −WH(qD∗l ) < 0 if and only
if D∗ < L−Δπ, which is not necessary for D∗ < L.18 A positive term WH(qLh )−WH(qD∗l )
implies that the risk of liquidating the firm in the low income state induces a higher distortion
in qD
∗
l than the one required in q
L
h to avoid certain liquidation at income state πH . This
positive term can induce the regulator to prefer absence of commitment for a high enough
level of critical debtD∗, as shown in Proposition 4 below. For a particular industry, numerical
analysis allows to measure whether D∗ is sufficiently high. I summarize the results in the
following proposition:
Proposition 4. Regulatory commitment to a quantity level q at t = 2 produces a loss
in the regulator’s welfare measure with respect to the no commitment policy if it induces
managers to choose D > D where D ∈ (L−Δπ, L). Conversely, regulatory commitment
generates a positive variation in the regulator’s welfare if it induces managers to choose
D = D∗ ≤ D. In particular,
(i) If managers choose D = L = D∗ or D = L > D∗, commitment is not optimal.
(ii) If managers choose full equity funding, D = 0 = D∗, commitment is optimal and
allows the regulator to set its preferred quantity level qr.
Proof. The extreme cases in (i) and (ii) have been proved above. To show the existence
of D, I take into account that WNC −WHL,D∗ < 0 for a critical debt level D∗ ≤ L−Δπ and
18This follows from taking the difference of πH +π(qLh ) = L and πL+π(q
D∗
l ) = D
∗ which leads to π(qLh )−
π(qD
∗
l ) = L −Δπ −D∗. The fact that π(.) is decreasing in q in the relevant range leads to qLh < qD
∗
l ←→
D∗ < L−Δπ.
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WNC −WHL,D∗ > 0 for D∗ = L. The expression WNC −WHL,D∗ in (11) can be rewritten as:
WNC −WHL,D∗ = β ·
(
w(qLh )− w(qD
∗
l )
)
(12)
+(1− β) · (w(qLl )− w(qD∗l ))
where w(q) = α · π(q) + CS(q) is continuous in q. The equations in (5) and continuity of
π(.) imply that quantity level qD
∗
l is a continuous function of a hypothetical critical value
D̂ = D∗. Function (12) is thus continuous in D̂ = D∗, and the intermediate value theorem
guarantees the existence of a set of critical values D̂ ∈ (L−Δπ, L) such that (12) is equal
to zero. The differentiability assumptions in Section 2 allow me to apply the chain rule to
∂(WNC −WHL,D∗)/∂D∗ and obtain:
∂(WNC −WHL,D∗)/∂D∗ = ∂qD∗l /∂D∗
(−)
· ∂w(qD∗l )/∂q
(+)
· (−β − (1− β))
(−)
> 0
where the sign of ∂qD
∗
l /∂D
∗ is derived from (6). Function (12) is then monotone increasing
in the hypothetical debt value D̂ = D∗ and there is a single D such that (12) is equal to
zero, as stated .19
Finally, I point out that the regulator downweights the income of the firm, and the change
in total social welfare can diverge from the variation in the regulator’s measure of welfare.
If qsoc ≡ argmax
q
π(q) + CS(q) and, given that qm < qsoc ≤ qr, the switch to a commitment
regime that allows to expand quantity q from qLh < qsoc and q
L
l < qsoc towards q
D∗
l > qsoc has
ambiguous consequences in total welfare as it substitutes a monopolistic quantity distortion
with excessive provision of q. Hypothetically, if commitment allows the expansion of quantity
q from qLh ≥ qsoc and qLl ≥ qsoc towards qD∗l > qsoc, it would actually decrease social welfare,
as it allows greater excess in q. If quantity q is expanded from qLh < qsoc and q
L
l < qsoc
towards qD
∗
l ≤ qsoc, commitment increases social welfare as it allows a lower monopolistic
19This proof shows that commitment creates value if managers choose debt D = D∗ that is below D for
a given set of the model’s parameters. Comparative statics on the variation of the model parameters would
require a different calculation as D∗, D and (12) are functions of the parameters.
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distortion. The variation of the regulator’s welfare measure and social welfare as a function
of the ability of the regulator to commit will be aligned in this latter case.
5 Conclusion
I provide in this article a framework in which the conflicts of interest between the different
stakeholders (managers, external investors, regulator) of a regulated firm make the welfare
of consumers and the value of this firm a function of its capital structure. A bankruptcy pro-
cedure with voluntary initiation is introduced to study the firm’s choice of capital structure
and regulatory policy, and I find that the true strategic value of the capital structure depends
on specific characteristics of bankruptcy law and the ability of the regulator to commit to a
limit on regulated income.
The analysis reveals that it is plausible that the managers of the regulated firm threaten
the regulator with the transfer of control to external investors to force higher regulated
income. This strategy is based on the relative higher value that the managers and the
regulator attach to continuation versus the external investors. The present work shows how
the transfer of control to investors becomes less of a threat to the regulator if the incentives of
the external investors for continuation improve. In this line, if bankruptcy regulation allows
for favorable conditions for reorganization versus liquidation, the use of leverage imposes
fewer constraints on the regulator. On the contrary, a relatively high liquidation value
can lead to a positive relation between leverage and regulated income. I also find that
the transfer of control to external shareholders through the issue of new voting equity can
replicate the strategic effect of high leverage if the new shareholders can not appropriate
the private benefits of managers. A pro-liquidation bankruptcy regime or the possibility to
transfer control with the issuance of new voting equity will then provide the regulator with
incentives to limit the discretion of the regulated firm to choose its capital structure.
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cial investments in industries where firms have a high need of external finance, the liqui-
dation value of the firms’s assets is aligned with financing needs and the regulator has a
pro-consumer bias. In these industries, the regulators would have an incentive to hold up
investors if the threat of liquidation through the bankruptcy process is not present. If the
above conditions do not hold, the conclusions must be revised. Firms with high retained
earnings might abuse the recourse to the liquidation process to force favorable regulation. For
example, utility firms might distribute high dividends and then finance the implementation
of new technology with uncertain cost with debt, and commercial banks might also choose
to pay high dividends during lending booms rather than using retained earnings to finance a
higher proportion of their loans. If the firm’s bankruptcy costs are high and the liquidation
value of the firms’s assets is low, as it might be the case with part of the infrastructure
of some utilities, the pro-liquidation framework does not impose a strong constraint on the
regulator. Additionally, a regulator with incentives aligned with the firm rather than with
consumers offers no justification for leverage as an investor protection scheme.
The policy of committing to a particular level of regulated income rather than adjusting
income ex post to exogenous shocks is also studied and it is found that optimal policy will
depend on the characteristics of the market. Commitment is not an unequivocally superior
policy. It might help to improve the regulator’s welfare measure if the regulator’s continua-
tion value is low relative to the continuation value of managers. In this case, commitment
to a relatively low regulated income forces the managers to limit leverage and the regulator
can increase consumer surplus without increasing the risk of liquidation. However, suffi-
cient conditions, particularly a high continuation value for the regulator, also exist for this
commitment power to force the regulator to ensure continuation of the firm at a social cost
higher than with the ex post optimal policy.
The results of the article predict that a pro-liquidation framework will protect benefi-
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A Sufficient Conditions for Concavity
Concavity of π(q) and W (q) is guaranteed if π′′(q) < 0 and W ′′(q) < 0, which are well
defined conditions given that π(q) and W (q) are C2 functions. If I define regulated revenues
as R(q), it is easy to combine π′′(q) < 0 and W ′′(q) < 0 into:
p′(q)− α · C ′′(q)
(1− α) < R
′′(q) < C ′′(q) (13)
The right and left bounds correspond respectively to the conditions π′′(q) < 0 and
W ′′(q) < 0. The revenue function R(q) should not be too convex to keep π(q) a concave
function. However, R(q) is subtracted from gross consumer surplus and enters W (q) with
negative sign, so R(q) should not be too concave to keep W (q) a concave function. Ex-
panding the second derivative of revenues, R′′(q) = p′′(q) · q + 2 · p′(q), I rewrite (13) as the
condition (2) given in Section 2:
(2 · α− 1) · p′(q)− α · C ′′(q)
(1− α) < p
′′(q) · q < C ′′(q)− 2 · p′(q)
Given the assumption that p′(q) < 0 and C ′′(q) ≥ 0 in Section 2, this extra condition
only restricts p′′(q). These bounds are properly defined if the right hand bound exceeds the
value of the left hand bound. That is,
(2 · α− 1) · p′(q)− α · C ′′(q) < (1− α) · C ′′(q)− 2 · (1− α) · p′(q)
⇔ p′(q) < C ′′(q)
which holds by the assumption that p′(q) < 0 and C ′′(q) ≥ 0.
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B Proof of Lemma 4
In this appendix, I will use the notation ∂ΔW/∂x to refer to the derivative of the function
ΔW (HL,H,D∗) with respect to a given parameter x. The function φ(.) will refer to the
inverse function of the regulated income π(.). Given the relevant range [qm,qr], φ(.) is a
one-to-one, strictly decreasing and concave function.20 Additionally, I use w(q) to denote
the term α · π(q) + CS(q). Given the relevant range [qm,qr], w(q) is a one-to-one, strictly
increasing and concave function from assumptions in Section 2.
For a critical level of debt D∗, the net welfare difference between the policies {H} and
{HL} is zero at D = D∗. Using the expression in (7):
ΔW (HL,H,D∗) = 0 (14)
The implicit function theorem, IFT henceforth, can be applied to (14), to obtain ∂D∗/∂x =
−(∂ΔW/∂x)/(∂ΔW/∂D∗) for D∗ ∈ (0, L) and parameter of interest x. If D∗ = 0 and
Dcrit < D∗ or D∗ = L, (14) does not generally hold and D∗ is constant in marginal vari-
ations of the parameters: ∂D∗/∂x = 0. That is why I include the qualification "at least
weakly" in Lemma 4.21 I next calculate ∂ΔW/∂D∗:
∂ΔW
∂D∗
= (1− β) ·
⎛
⎜⎝∂w(φ(D∗ − πL))
∂φ(.)
(+)
· ∂φ(D
∗ − πL)
∂D∗
(−)
⎞
⎟⎠ (15)
−β ·
⎛
⎜⎝∂w(φ(D∗ − πH))
∂φ(.)
(+)
· ∂φ(D
∗ − πH)
∂D∗
(−)
− ∂w(φ(D
∗ − πL))
∂φ(.)
(+)
· ∂φ(D
∗ − πL)
∂D∗
(−)
⎞
⎟⎠
< 0
20The regulated income π(q) attains the maximum at qm. Given the assumptions on π(q), two quantities
in [0, q] can yield the same income I = π(qm). The regulator will choose the higher quantity as it yields
higher consumer surplus. φ(.) is then a function rather than a correspondence.
21If D∗ = Dcrit = 0 or D∗ = L and ΔW (HL,H,L) = 0, the critical debt level D∗ will not be differentiable,
but we still can define the respective right and left derivatives and obtain the monotonicity result in (0, L).
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The second term of the expression above is negative, since φ(.) and w(q) are strictly
decreasing and concave in [qm,qr], as presented in Section 3. The sign of the first term also
follows from monotonicity of w(q).22
Proof of (i), (ii) and (iii). These parts require the computation of the following
derivatives:
∂ΔW
∂πH
= −β ·
⎛
⎜⎝∂w(φ(D∗ − πH))
∂φ(.)
(+)
· ∂φ(D
∗ − πH)
∂πH
(+)
⎞
⎟⎠ ≤ 0 (16)
∂ΔW
∂πL
= (1− β) · α+ ∂w(φ(D
∗ − πL))
∂φ(.)
(+)
· ∂φ(D
∗ − πL)
∂πL
(+)
> 0 (17)
Note that ∂ΔW/∂πH = 0 if the income requirement π(qDh ) + πH = D
∗ in the high state
does not bind. The derivatives ∂D∗/∂πL and ∂D∗/∂πH follow then directly from the IFT,
(15), (16) and (17):
∂D∗
∂πL
= −∂ΔW
∂πL
/
∂ΔW
∂D∗
> 0 (18)
∂D∗
∂πH
= −∂ΔW
∂πH
/
∂ΔW
∂D∗
≤ 0 (19)
For an income level π, |∂D∗/∂πL| > |∂D∗/∂πH |. This follows from the fact that an
increase in πL improves both the continuation value at state πL and decreases the cost of
the quantity reduction qD
∗
h − qD∗l at state πH . An increase in πH only increases the cost of
the reduction qD
∗
h − qD∗l and by a smaller amount than a reduction in πL of the same size.
Claim (iii) follows immediately by subtracting (18) from (19).
Proof of (iv). I compute first the derivative:
∂ΔW
∂β
= α · L− α · πL − CSL − w(φ(D∗ − πH))
(−)
< 0 (20)
22The derivative is presented for the range of D∗ such that π(qDh ) + πH = D
∗ is binding. Otherwise,
∂D∗ > 0 does no impact the income requirement at πH and ∂φ(π(qr) − πH)/∂D∗ = 0. The sign of
∂ΔW/∂D∗ would not be altered by the effect of the other terms.
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in the range [qm,qr] and qm ≤ φ(D∗ − πH) ≤ qr. The derivative ∂D∗/∂β follows from the
IFT, (15) and (20):
∂D∗
∂β
= −∂ΔW
∂β
/
∂ΔW
∂D∗
< 0
The negative sign of ∂D∗/∂β follows from the fact that a higher probability of the high
income state πH reduces the expected benefit of ensuring continuation for income state πL
and increases the expected cost from the quantity distortion at income state πH .
Proof of (v). As α increases, the objectives of the investors and the regulator become
more similar and the regulator weighs higher the income of the firm. If πL+ π(qDl ) < L, the
increase in α reduces the welfare gain from supporting the firm in the low income state πL,
as the negative difference πL+π(qDl )−L receives a greater weight. This fact makes the sign
of ∂ΔW/∂α ambiguous. However, this effect is negligible for D∗ → L and I can obtain:
lim
D∗→L
∂ΔW
∂α
= lim
D∗→L
[
(1− β) · (πL + π(qD∗l )− L) + β · [π(qD
∗
l )− π(qD
∗
h )]
]
(21)
= 0 + β · [π(qLl )− π(qLh )] > 0 (22)
The application of the IFT, (15) and (21) yields ∂D∗/∂α > 0.
Proof of (vi). The increase in CSL makes continuation more desirable for the regulator
and it will be therefore willing to allow greater quantity distortions without liquidation of the
firm. Formally, ∂D∗/∂CSL > 0 follows from the IFT, (15) and ∂ΔW/∂CSL = (1− β) > 0.
C Numerical Example
I study numerically the sensitivity of optimal leverage, value of the firm and social welfare
to the relative probability of the low and high income states (β) and the income difference
between the states (Δπ). I use a simple linear demand (p(q) = 100− 5q) and quadratic cost
(c(q) = q2) specification, but it is straightforward to modify the implemented program for
a different functional form. The rest of parameters affecting the behavior of the regulator,
where the negative sign follows from the assumption in Section 4 that w(.)+CSL+α·πL > α·L
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managers and investors take the following values: α = 0.5, K = 500, L = 500, B = 425,
CSH = 1000, CSL = 100, and πL = 500.
In Table 1, I consider three cases for the income difference Δπ that correspond to
{πH = 1.1 · πL, πH = 1.5 · πL, πH = 2 · πL}. For each of these cases, I present, as a function
of probability β, the managers’s choice of debt level D normalized by the liquidation value
(D/L), and the relative welfare loss for the regulator (ΔW/W ) and relative gain in firm’s
value (ΔV/V ) when debt D is used instead of full equity finance. As the low income state
becomes less likely (β → 1) and the income difference bigger (Δπ → 1), the regulator stops
supporting the firm at the low income state (πL) and the managers limit the use of debt
with D/L < 1. The lower leverage mitigates the welfare losses and reduces the value gain
associated to the use of debt. The figures 5, 6 and 7 present these results graphically. I have
also studied the effect of increasing private benefits (B) and consumer welfare (CSL). The
results are predictable from Lemma 4 and Proposition 3 and omitted for brevity.
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Table 1: Numerical Analysis
Case 1 : Δπ = 0.1
β ΔW/W ΔV/V D/L
0.5 0.08 7.99 1
0.65 0.07 6.96 1
0.85 0.06 5.93 1
0.9 0.06 5.71 1
0.95 0.06 5.52 1
Case 2 : Δπ = 0.5
β ΔW/W ΔV/V D/L
0.5 0.07 2.67 1
0.65 0.07 2.13 1
0.85 0.06 1.68 1
0.9 0.06 1.60 1
0.95 0.02 0.73 0.5840
Case 3 : Δπ = 1
β ΔW/W ΔV/V D/L
0.5 0.07 1.45 1
0.65 0.06 1.14 1
0.85 0.06 0.89 1
0.9 0.04 0.74 0.9030
0.95 0.02 0.38 0.5840
Figure 1: Timeline (Base Model)
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Figure 2: Timeline (Model with Income Risk)
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BANCO DE ESPAÑA 54 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 1128
Figure 3: Value of Debt (Example 1 for Model with Income Risk)
D
V?D?
L ? B ? K
LD??L ? ??qr? ? ? ??qr?
? ? ??qr? ? B ? K
? ? ??D? ? ? ? ?? ? B ? K
L ? ? ? B ? K
?1 ? ?? ? ?D? ? B ? L?
Figure 4: Value of Debt (Example 2 for Model with Income Risk)
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Figure 5: Numerical Example (Δπ = 0.1 · πL)
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Note: β represents the probability of the high income state. ΔW/W and ΔV/V represent
the relative welfare loss and gain in firm’s value from use of leverage D/L.
Figure 6: Numerical Example (Δπ = 0.5 · πL)
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Note: β represents the probability of the high income state. ΔW/W and ΔV/V represent
the relative welfare loss and gain in firm’s value from use of leverage D/L.
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Figure 7: Numerical Example (Δπ = 1 · πL)
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Note: β represents the probability of the high income state. ΔW/W and ΔV/V represent
the relative welfare loss and gain in firm’s value from use of leverage D/L.
BANCO DE ESPAÑA PUBLICATIONS  
WORKING PAPERS1  
1032 
 
1033 
 
1034 
 
1035 
1036 
1037 
 
1038 
1039 
 
1101 
 
1102 
1103 
 
1104 
 
1105 
 
1106 
1107 
 
1108 
1109 
 
1110 
1111 
1112 
 
1113 
1114 
1115 
1116 
 
1117 
 
1118 
 
1119 
 
1120 
 
GABE J. DE BONDT, TUOMAS A. PELTONEN AND DANIEL SANTABÁRBARA: Booms and busts in China's stock 
market: Estimates based on fundamentals. 
CARMEN MARTÍNEZ-CARRASCAL AND JULIAN VON LANDESBERGER: Explaining the demand for money by non-
financial corporations in the euro area: A macro and a micro view. 
CARMEN MARTÍNEZ-CARRASCAL: Cash holdings, firm size and access to external finance. Evidence for  
the euro area. 
CÉSAR ALONSO-BORREGO: Firm behavior, market deregulation and productivity in Spain. 
OLYMPIA BOVER: Housing purchases and the dynamics of housing wealth. 
DAVID DE ANTONIO LIEDO AND ELENA FERNÁNDEZ MUÑOZ: Nowcasting Spanish GDP growth in real time: “One 
and a half months earlier”. 
FRANCESCA VIANI: International financial flows, real exchange rates and cross-border insurance. 
FERNANDO BRONER, TATIANA DIDIER, AITOR ERCE AND SERGIO L. SCHMUKLER: Gross capital flows: dynamics 
and crises. 
GIACOMO MASIER AND ERNESTO VILLANUEVA: Consumption and initial mortgage conditions: evidence from 
survey data. 
PABLO HERNÁNDEZ DE COS AND ENRIQUE MORAL-BENITO: Endogenous fiscal consolidations. 
CÉSAR CALDERÓN, ENRIQUE MORAL-BENITO AND LUIS SERVÉN: Is infrastructure capital productive? A dynamic 
heterogeneous approach. 
MICHAEL DANQUAH, ENRIQUE MORAL-BENITO AND BAZOUMANA OUATTARA: TFP growth and its determinants: 
nonparametrics and model averaging. 
JUAN CARLOS BERGANZA AND CARMEN BROTO: Flexible inflation targets, forex interventions and exchange rate 
volatility in emerging countries. 
FRANCISCO DE CASTRO, JAVIER J. PÉREZ AND MARTA RODRÍGUEZ VIVES: Fiscal data revisions in Europe. 
ANGEL GAVILÁN, PABLO HERNÁNDEZ DE COS, JUAN F. JIMENO AND JUAN A. ROJAS: Fiscal policy, structural 
reforms and external imbalances: a quantitative evaluation for Spain. 
EVA ORTEGA, MARGARITA RUBIO AND CARLOS THOMAS: House purchase versus rental in Spain. 
ENRIQUE MORAL-BENITO: Dynamic panels with predetermined regressors: likelihood-based estimation and 
Bayesian averaging with an application to cross-country growth. 
NIKOLAI STÄHLER AND CARLOS THOMAS: FiMod – a DSGE model for fiscal policy simulations. 
ÁLVARO CARTEA AND JOSÉ PENALVA: Where is the value in high frequency trading?  
FILIPA SÁ AND FRANCESCA VIANI: Shifts in portfolio preferences of international investors: an application to 
sovereign wealth funds. 
REBECA ANGUREN MARTÍN: Credit cycles: Evidence based on a non-linear model for developed countries. 
LAURA HOSPIDO: Estimating non-linear models with multiple fixed effects: A computational note. 
ENRIQUE MORAL-BENITO AND CRISTIAN BARTOLUCCI: Income and democracy: Revisiting the evidence. 
AGUSTÍN MARAVALL HERRERO AND DOMINGO PÉREZ CAÑETE: Applying and interpreting model-based seasonal
adjustment. The euro-area industrial production series. 
JULIO CÁCERES-DELPIANO: Is there a cost associated with an increase in family size beyond child investment? 
Evidence from developing countries. 
DANIEL PÉREZ, VICENTE SALAS-FUMÁS AND JESÚS SAURINA: Do dynamic provisions reduce income smoothing
using loan loss provisions? 
GALO NUÑO, PEDRO TEDDE AND ALESSIO MORO: Money dynamics with multiple banks of issue: evidence from 
Spain 1856-1874. 
RAQUEL CARRASCO, JUAN F. JIMENO AND A. CAROLINA ORTEGA: Accounting for changes in the Spanish wage 
distribution: the role of employment composition effects. 
                                                          
1. Previously published Working Papers are listed in the Banco de España publications catalogue. 
1121 
 
1122 
1123 
1124 
 
1125 
1126 
1127 
 
1128 
 
FRANCISCO DE CASTRO AND LAURA FERNÁNDEZ-CABALLERO: The effects of fiscal shocks on the exchange 
rate in Spain. 
JAMES COSTAIN AND ANTON NAKOV: Precautionary price stickiness.  
ENRIQUE MORAL-BENITO: Model averaging in economics.  
GABRIEL JIMÉNEZ, ATIF MIAN, JOSÉ-LUIS PEYDRÓ AND JESÚS SAURINA: Local versus aggregate lending channels: 
the effects of securitization on corporate credit supply. 
ANTON NAKOV AND GALO NUÑO: A general equilibrium model of the oil market. 
DANIEL C. HARDY AND MARÍA J. NIETO: Cross-border coordination of prudential supervision and deposit guarantees. 
LAURA FERNÁNDEZ-CABALLERO, DIEGO J. PEDREGAL AND JAVIER J. PÉREZ: Monitoring sub-central 
government spending in Spain. 
CARLOS PÉREZ MONTES: Optimal capital structure and regulatory control. 
 
Unidad de Publicaciones 
Alcalá 522, 28027 Madrid 
Telephone +34 91 338 6363. Fax +34 91 338 6488 
E-mail: publicaciones@bde.es 
www.bde.es 
